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I. INTRODUCTION

Between June 20 and June 27, 1997, federal and state courts handed down
four decisions that could crucially impact the future of Internet content
regulation) The cases include the controversial United States Supreme Court
case ACLU v. Reno, which struck down most of the federal government's

lACLU v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (decided June 26, 1997); American Libraries
Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (decided June 20, 1997); ACLU v.
Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga.1997) (decided June 23, 1997); People v. Lipsitz, 663
N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (decided June 23, 1997).
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Communications Decency Act.2 Three of the rulings invalidated laws that
directly regulated the Internet, while one decision upheld use of a pre-existing
law to regulate Internet activity.3
In each case, the judges openly pondered how to harness the Internet or even
whether to harness it, citing its geographical vagueness as a factor that
complicates the question.4 Their opinions ran the gamut. In the stead of any
consensus, state and federal legislators continue their attempts to restrain the
world's "information superhighway."S Should any governmental body be able
to regulate the Internet? Due to its unorthodox ignorance of geography, a
concept important to many court cases, can any such body regulate the
Internet?
This Note summarizes recent tests of state and federal Internet content
regulations and analyzes the impact the Internet's incompatibility with "real
space" geography had or might have had on the courts' reasoning. To some
extent, it posits what problems the incompatibility poses for impending
legislation. In the midst of such discussion, this Note opines that state and
federal regulations of the Internet could conceivably both fail Constitutional
muster, due specifically to the "Net's" physical shortcomings.6
Part II of this Note offers a background of the Internet's different
communication capacities and describes its conflicts with geography. Part III
summarizes the courts' problems in deciding whether they have personal
jurisdiction over specific Internet activities.
Part IV briefly outlines arguments for and against state regulation of the
Internet. First, it capsulizes the U.S. Supreme Court's dormant Commerce
Clause standards. Second, it summarizes one federal court's application of
those standards to invalidate a state Internet content law. Third, it applies the
standards to another state law case. Finally, it uses a third case to weigh possible
limitations to dormant Commerce Clause invalidations of laws that restrict
content on the Internet.

247 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (d) (1996) (amending Communications Act of 1934,
§ 233(a), (d)). See also Annoy.com Attacks Remaining Communications Decency Act
Provisions (posted Nov. 3, 1997) (visited Jan. 4, 1998) <http:/ /www.aclu.org/issues/
cyber I updates/ clunov03.html>.

3Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329; Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160; Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1228.
Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 468 (applied consumer fraud protection statute to Internet usage
situation).

4See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343, 2353; Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169; Miller, 977 F. Supp. at
1228; Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
5"Information superhighway" is a term for the Internet often used by Vice President
AI Gore. For an interesting branch-off on the highway, see LANCE ROSE, NETLAW: YOUR
RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 170-71 (1995).
6The "net" is a common slang name for the Internet, used so much that a 1994 movie
of that name starring Sandra Bullock played off the double entendre. See also Lawrence
Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 10 (1990).
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Part V looks at federal regulation of the Internet. It first details U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurring opinion in ACLU v. Reno, in
which she hints at zoning the Internet. It then applies a First Amendment
zoning test to the content prohibited by the Communications Decency Act and
other states. The Note concludes in Part VI with details of a third type of
regulation, the Internet industry's self-regulation, and earmarks the industry
efforts as the best way for regulation to proceed.
II. MAPPING OUT 1HE INTERNET

The Internet is at its most basic an international "network of networks."7 Its
"chaotic, random structure" of more than 500,000 independent network
computers connect to nine million host computers in ninety countries,B making
the information housed on those computers rapidly available to anyone with
the correct computer software, a modem and an "Internet service provider"
("ISP").9 It is by nature an unregulated medium, and no one entity completely
controls it.lO
Despite the fact that so many people can access the Internet from so many
places, the Internet operates largely contrary to the idea of geography.ll It has
no geographically fixed point and, at this point, no borders.l2 To some
commentators, the medium-known to most as "cyberspace"l3_"virtually
transcends geography."14 In fact, most of the concepts which a person uses to
communicate on the Internet make it almost impossible to determine the
physical location of an accessed resource or another user.
A. Internet Addresses

Although Internet communications are based on a seemingly geographical
concept-addresses-most do not consistently mirror a geographical location.
Instead, they provide a "logical" framework in which the information can
travel.l5

7Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 164.

Bid.; Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
9ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,832-833 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
10 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.

l1See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 167, 169.
12Jd. at 167.

l3Reno,ll7S. Ct. at2335.
l4Report on Electronic Commerce, Hype Gives Way to Reality in 1996: Electronic
Commerce Feels Hangover, in INTERNET AND ONLINE LAw i, x (Kent D. Stuckey ed.,
1996)[hereinafter Hype Gives Way].
l5Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 165.
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In their most general form, the addresses-also called "domain
names"-describe the type of organization a user is contacting.l6 Addresses
have several tiers, starting from the end of the address, that increase in
specificity.l7 For example, the designations such as "-.com" and "-.gov" ends
many addresses; "-.com" signifies a person or entity working through a
commercial user, while the "-.gov" designation ends the addresses of networks
associated with the federal government.18 The complete address
"jsmith@omega.csuohio.edu"19 might hint to the location of the information
received. However, the address "pixie@geocities.com" does not, especially once
it is known that Geocities, an ISP, offers Internet access to people in practically
every state.20
B. Modes of Communication

Most of the ways a "cybernaut"21 can communicate on the Internet rely on
Internet addresses, and many of the modes have their own devices that can
blur the location of communicators even more. One example is electronic mail
("e-mail").
"E-mail" software lets any user transmit an electronic
message-conceptually equivalent to instant mail-to anyone who has
another Internet address.22 As stated before, the addressee's actual location or
even identity is rarely known. Users can create an e-mail alias23 or employ an

16Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
26, 1997).
17Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 952-53 (C.D.
Cal. 1997). Under a contract with the National Science Foundation, a company called
Network Systems Inc. manages domain name registrations. Other top-level domain
names include "-.org," for non-profit organizations; "-.edu," for educational institutions;
".net," for among other things, networks. Registration is affordable: $100 for a start-up
two-year contract, and $50 per year thereafter. Id. at 953.
Most Internet addresses have two "fungible" addresses: an alphanumeric domain
name and also a numeric "internet protocol" such as "123.456.123.12." While both work
equally as well, domain names have been the subject of court cases because of the
familiarity that the names can have with users and consumers. See Hearst, 1997 WL
97097, at *2.

lBLockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 952,953.
19For a detailed explanation of domain names, see also MTV Networks v. Curry, 867
F. Supp. 202,203-204 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

20See
Geocities,
(posted
date unknown)
<http: I /www .geocities.com/ main/ info>.

(visited

Feb.

8,

1998)

21A "cybernaut" is a slang term for an Internet user. See Dan Burk, Federalism in
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1095, 1099 (1996).
22Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

23Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2337 n.20.
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anonymous remailer24 to make their identity and location even more difficult
to discern.
A user who communicates by subscribing to a "listserv"25 has no way of
knowing the e-mail addresses or locations of other subscribers. A listserv
automatically compiles messages sent to it by its members and mails out a "list"
at the end of a certain period.26 Contributors to "newsgroups" give only their
e-mail addresses.27 Newsgroups are monitored discussion lists that a person
accesses through a fixed link.28
Internet relay chat ("IRC")29 and file transfer protocol30 do not use addresses.
IRC users participate in real-time discussions and identify themselves with any
name of their choosing upon entering the chat.31 File transfer protocol users
contact a host computer network and download files anonymously.32
On the World Wide Web, "surfers"33 use addresses to reach information
destinations, but can also bypass addresses entirely by using sometimes
nondescript links to move from information site to information site.34 The
"Web"35 consists of an innumerable collection of information-filled pages
written in compatible languages that a user accesses with web "browser"
software.36 Besides using known addresses, Web surfers move from site to site
with the help of "hypertext links"37 or highlighted text on a Web page that, in
the background computer language, connects the user to another Web site. The
Web also houses "search engines,"38 which search the entire Web for sites
containing certain words or phrases, and create links to those pages.

24Jd.
25Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927.
26[d.
27[d. See also JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW: THE LAW OF THE INTERNET 13 (1997).
28Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 928.
29Jd.
30Jd.
31Id. See also RosE, supra note 5, at 14, 15.
32Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929.
33Traveling along the World Wide Web from site to site is commonly called "surfing."
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335.

34Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929.
35Jd. The "web" is a slang term for the World Wide Web.
36Jd.
37RoSENOER, supra note 27, at 9-11. See also Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1230, 1232.

38Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929.
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The Web also is popular because of the ease with which users can set up their
informational sites. However, once "content provider" posts their content on
the Internet, they cannot prevent that content from being accessed by anyone.39
C. The Way Information Travels

The transmission of information on the Internet from address to address
does not normally follow a straight line. Instead, information is broken into
"packets"40 and transmitted through any number of routes, as the capacity of
an intermediary network allows. It reassembles at the final address.41 For
example, e-mail messages sent from the headquarters of Exchangenet,42 an ISP
in Cleveland, Ohio, to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lewis Research Center located in the same city normally travel through a server
in Atlanta, Georgia.
To summarize, even with domain names or addresses, Internet users might
not accurately know from where information has come nor to where they have
sent it. Such a system lies contrary not only to geography, but to courts and
laws.43 The inability to predict the location of a site one might visit, coupled
with the inability of the site to prevent one's visit, could cause conflicts of
opinion in state's ability to pass laws and courts' abilities to apply such laws,
as discussed below.
III. PROBLEMS WITH PERSONAL JURISDICTIONAL

In the past few years, judges, as much as users, have grappled with the
problem of the Internet sites' lack of discernable location-most basically when
they have questioned whether to grant personal jurisdiction over an Internet
user. For example, court opinions cross the gamut on what contact is enough
for "minimum contacts"44 and what action constitutes "purposeful
availment."45 Although one federal district court46 recently offered a set of

39Reno, 117S. Ct. at2336.
40Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926.

41Jd.
42for example, a message sent on February 1, 1998 went through the following
servers and addresses: from core1-hssi8.ds3. cleveland.en.net (204.89.181.210), to
901.Hssi1-0.GW1.CLE1.ALTER.NET (137.39.144.17), to FddiOO.CR2.CLEl.Alter.Net
(137.39.37.100),
to
119.Hssi60.CR2.CHI1.Alter.Net
(137.39.58.178),
to
312.atm10.brl.chil.alter.net (137.39.13.105), to core3-hssi3 O.WillowSprings.mci.net
(206.157.77.81),
to
bordercore2.Atlanta.mci.net
(166.48.48.1),
to
oarnet-c-omci.Atlanta.mci.net (166.48.49.254), to oeb1-atm20. columbus.oar.net
(199.18.202.11), to nasa-sl2-2.cleveland.oar.net (199.18.105.234)m to 198.118.128.1, and
finally to fwOl.lerc.nasa.gov (139.88.145.14).
43Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

44International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
45Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958).
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guidelines, they might be premature, since recent opinions continue to greatly
conflict.
The Internet complicates the issue because it does not mesh well with the
normal conventions for personal jurisdiction. Traditional notions of
export/import, sending/receiving, and traveling-notions that in the real
world are relied upon to assert jurisdiction-do not apply to the Internet.47
The main struggle has been how to classify the Internet medium. One option
is to compare the Internet to a national magazine,48 because it is accessible by
anyone anywhere in the country, and not targeted at any residents in particular.
Another recommendation is to compare Internet sites to national television
shows, since they do not target specific audiences, and like television, users
must take affirmative steps to access it.49
Such classifications, however, would impart almost a per se availment upon
the people who provide the Internet's content, and would make irrelevant what
kind and extent of contact providers had with the forum state.SO As before
stated, content providers cannot prevent anyone from accessing their
information anywhere once they upload that information onto the Internet.Sl
Courts have split on whether the classifications apply and whether Internet
existence is enough for defendants to be hauled into court.52
One state court recently reasoned in a case against a corporation that, by its
invitation to United States users to download images, the company "is causing
and contributing to their distribution within the United States."53 Mere
advertising without purposeful contacts with a certain state is enough for
personal jurisdiction, because the appearance of the user's information on the
Internet "indicates a defendant's intent to serve the market in that state ....
Defendants who know their message will be broadcast in this state are subject
to suit here."54 A federal court ruled for personal jurisdiction merely on future
contacts: "defendant has obtained the website for the purpose of and in

46SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Inv., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997).
47 State Indictment of Internet Casino Highlights Online Jurisdiction, 66 USLW 2054, 2055
(1997)[hereinafter Internet Casino].

48See Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
49 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336,2345.
50 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.

5lReno, 117S. Ct. at2334.
52 See infra notes 52-70.
53Humphreyv. GraniteGateResorts,Inc.,568N.W.2d 715,719 (Minn. Ct. App.1997)
(citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1044
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
54 Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987)). See also Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Henry Zupac, 993F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(Defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction when they ran an Internet site
accessible in Ohio and advertised in trade journal with large Ohio circulation).
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anticipation that internet users, searching the internet for websites, will access
the defendant's website and eventually sign up on the defendant's mailing list.
Its intent is to reach all internet users," regardless of location. 55
A seemingly larger number56 of courts, however, have decided to require
more than an Internet content provider's "purposeful availment"57 to bring the
provider into the court's jurisdiction.
A finding of personal jurisdiction in [a state] based on an Internet web
site would mean that there would be nationwide (indeed, worldwide)
personal jurisdiction over anyone and everyone who establishes an
Internet web site. Such nationwide jurisdiction is not consistent with
traditional personal ~urisdiction case law nor acceptable to the Court
as a matter of policy. 8
Instead, the courts suggest that a ruling of personal jurisdiction should depend
upon a showing of some kind of active pursuit of contacts with the forum in
question.59 E-mail messages to an Internet service provider in the forum state
satisfy the test.60 Other examples include providing a toll-free number with the
Internet content in question;61 soliciting contributions;62 providing an e-mail
address to which interested parties can write for more information;63 and
providing a prompt connected to the site so that those interested parties can
sign up for a mailing list subscribe to the service, or order merchandise.64
However, the line between passive and active availment blurred in a recent
case, as evidenced by a Missouri state court's recent injunction against a gamb-

55Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, 947 F. Supp 1328,
56The term "larger" is used for what it is worth. Internet law is still a small, but
burgeoning, field of law.
57Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,417 (1997).
58 Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *1.
59 See SF Hotel Co., 985 F. Supp. at 1035 (determining that a passive Web site "is not
grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction").
60Edias Software Int'l LLC v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
61 Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
62

.H~roes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp.1 (D.D.C.1996) (soliciting contributions,
prov1dmg toll-free number, and using infringing trademark and logo was sustained
contact).

63zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

64Maritz, 947F. Supp. at 1332-1333. See also Parks Inn Int'l, Inc. v. Pacific Plaza Hotels,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762,764-65 (D. Ariz. 1998) (web site's "interactive" registration form
along with listing of address, telephone and fax number, and e-mail address, satisfied
purposeful availment.)
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ling Web site. 65 Missouri prohibits gambling anywhere other than at
state-approved riverboat casinos.66 The ruling judge banned the Internet
company from operating, marketing, offering or promoting a gambling
establishment in the state, based on the fact that the company held two accounts
opened by Missourians.67 Both accounts were opened by state investigators.68
A Kansas federal district court recently posited a balancing rule to reconcile
the conflicting cases.69 "[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet," its opinion
said?O "This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal
jurisdiction principles."71
While the balancing rule merits serious consideration, the Internet holds
forth questions regarding personal jurisdiction that have yet to be evaluated.
Courts have not discussed notions of unfairness and undue burden on novice
internet content providers versus commercial providers,72 nor have they tested
jurisdiction of Internet areas more vague than the Web, such as IRCs,
newsgroups and listservs?3 Courts also have spoken little of personal
jurisdiction in criminal trials, which could become a factor as more and more
states pass legislation criminalizing some pornographic aspects of the
Internet?4 Foremost, despite the conflicting talk and attempt at resolution, the
question of exactly where transactions take place when they occur on the Web
does not have a clear answer?5

65Joe Lambe, No Missouri Bets by Internet Link, Judge Rules, KAN. CITY STAR, May 24,
1997, at Al.

66[d.
67[d.
68[d.
69SF Hotel Co., 985 F. Supp. at 1034.
70Jd. "A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to

those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction."
Id.
71[d.

72See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171.
73See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,328 (4th Cir. 1997). AOL users can
communicate publicly by posting messages on the ISP's "bulletin boards." Zeran filed
a negligence suit against AOL based on information posted on one of the boards. Id.
74(post date unknown) <http:/ /www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/censor/stbills.htm>
(visited on Jan. 5, 1998)[hereinafter http:/ /www.aclu.org/].
75 Internet Casino, supra note 47, at 2055.
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STATE REGULATION: LACK OF SITUS A STUMBLING BLOCK

Without knowing the fixed boundaries of an Internet site, it would seem
misconceived for legislators to write a law to regulate it within a fixed area.
However, as of June 1997, at least thirteen states had passed legislation
regulating the Internet since 1995, and many of them had additional legislation
under discussion?6 While several of those states have created laws to tax
commercial Internet activities, most of the new laws aim to regulate the content
of transmissions across the Internet medium, such as an e-mail and its
attachments, or access to Web pages or newsgroups with certain types of
content.77 For example, a recently overturned Virginia law made illegal any
use of state-owned computers to access "sexually explicit material."78
State legislators have made pornographic images and writings their main
content target,79 and opponents responded in 1997 by challenging several of
the statutes on First Amendment grounds.SO In the past two years, however,
commentators, opponents and courts have started to use the United States
Constitution's Commerce Clause as another-and perhaps initial-test to
determine the validity of state Internet regulations.Sl In the words of
commentator Glenn Harlan Reynolds: "[o]nly where regulations pass the
Commerce Clause test is it even necessary to address First Amendment
issues."82 In cases involving a New York law and a New Mexico law, a federal
district court ruled them unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds.83 An
analysis of the clause's applicability to the Internet's geographically vague
nature demonstrates that most state regulations are ill-suited to the cyberspace
medium.

76http:/ /www.aclu.org/, supra note 74. California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Virginia and, of course, New York and Georgia passed bills during 1995 through 1998.
Illinois, New York and Virginia had additional legislation under discussion. At least
nine states had legislation pending in 1998.

77Jd.
78Jd. See also Urofksy v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998); VA. CODE 1950
VA. CODE ANN.

§ 82.1-804; <http://www.aclu.org/court/urofskyvallencom.html>;
§§ 2.1-804-806 (Michie 1997).

79http:/ /www.aclu.org/, supra note 74.
80http:/ /www.aclu.org/, supra note 74; Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1228; Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. at 183. The Pataki court bowed to the U.S. Supreme Court's then impending
determination on the issue.
81 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 2, d. 1. For additional commentary, see also Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, Virtual Reality and 'Virtual Welters': a Note of the Commerce Clause Implications
of Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA. L. REv. 535 (1996); Dan Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28
CONN. L. REv. 1095 (1996).
82Reynolds, supra note 81, at 536.

B3Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160 (as practically predicted by Burk, supra note 81); ACLU
v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M. 1998).
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A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The United States Supreme Court ("the Court") and other courts historically
have used a loose definition for the concept of interstate commerce, holding
that even situations such as driving people across state lines fall under the
category.84 Using the Court's rulings as a guideline, lower courts have
determined that Internet communication, specifically electronically mailing
images through the Internet, qualifies as interstate commerce.85 The decisions
suggest that the Internet like all interstate commerce, should be regulated by
the federal govemment.86
Few federal Internet laws currently exist that can preempt state regulation
because it conflicts with the federal right to regulate under the Clause. In June
1997, the Court ruled unconstitutional most of the federal government's
Communications Decency Act ("the Act," "the CDA"), affirming the earlier
judgment of a special three-judge district court panel.87 Still, even when
Congress has not regulated an area, state laws must survive scrutiny under the
clause's negative or "dormant" use, which "limits the ability of states to impede
the flow of interstate commerce and to legislate in that area deemed reserved
for federallegislation."88
Commentators have adopted one of two approaches to analyze the Internet
regulation for "dormant" conflicts: the dormant analysis89 and the tax
analysis.90 Theorists on each side admit problems with state regulation of the
Internet stem in part from a lack of firm physical presence for the medium's
activities.91
Under the dormant analysis, any state regulations that "purposely
discriminate" against interstate commerce are practically invalid per se without
extraordinary justification.92 Ordinarily, a court must first identify a local

84Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); see also Camps Newfound Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
85United States v. Schooley, No. ACM 32682, 1997 WL 517486 at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App., Aug. 11, 1997) (citing United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997) and
United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,706-9 (6th Cir. 1996)).

86See infra notes 114-69 and accompanying text.
87 Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329. Some of the regulations within the Act still pass muster, such
as the ISP's immunity from liability as a publisher of defamatory material that appears
on their service. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
88Burk, supra note 81, at 1123-24.

89 Id. at 1123.
90Reynolds, supra note 81, at 539. Logistically speaking, the analyses could both fall
under the dormant analysis heading.
91 Burk, supra note 81, at 1126; Reynolds, supra note 81, at 539.
92Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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public interest benefited by the regulation and determine its legitimacy.93
Courts have roundly rejected as illegitimate any sort of measure that
economically benefits or protects the state at the expense of other states.94 If
the state interest is deemed legitimate, the court must then balance it against
the federal interest in maintaining an unburdened interstate commerce.95 The
weight of the burden allowed hinges on the local interest's nature and the
option of reasonable alternatives to the legislation that would cause "less of an
impact" on interstate commercial activities.96
Local health and safety measures have been accorded leeway in their
impingement on interstate commerce.97 However, the Court drew a line even
there in a 1981 case over an Iowa transportation regulation that conflicted with
all of its neighboring states.
Regulations that touch upon safety, especially highway safety, are
those that 'the Court has been most reluctant to invalidate' ... But
incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does
not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack. Regulations
designed for that salutary purpose nevertheless may further the
purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so substantially,
as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.98
In general, the Court has determined that such state regulations, especially
those deemed inconsistent with the policies of surrounding states, cause an
inordinate burden on the commercial activities between them.99 "The menace
of inconsistent state regulation invites analysis ... because that clause
represented the framers' reaction to overreaching by the individual states that
might jeopardize the growth of the nation and in particular, the national
infrastructure of communications."lOO Such statutes may also cause an
extraterritorial effect in the areas they were created to regulate, adversely
affecting interstate commerce. For example, a Connecticut law requiring beer

93Jd. at 142.

94Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).

95Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. But see Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486
U.S. 888, 897 (1988) Oustice Antonin Scalia stated that "[w]eighing the governmental
interests of a state against the needs of interstate commerce is ... a task squarely within
the responsibility of Congress.").
96Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
97Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1983).
98Jd. at 670 (quoting Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,443 (1978)).

99 See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (striking down an Illinois
law requiring special mudflaps on trucks in contrast to the laws of surrounding states).
See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1957) (involving a state's
corporation regulations).

lOOPataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169 (referring to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,
312 (1992)).
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distributors to post their wholesale prices in the state to affirm they were no
higher than those charged in the four states bordering was invalidated on the
grounds of its extraterritorial effect.lOl "While a State may seek lower prices for
its consumers, it may not insist that producers or consumers in other States
surrender whatever competitive advantages they may possess."102 Finally,
state legislators may overstep their bounds-invalidating their legislative
work-if the interest they seek to regulate transcends state boundaries; in other
words, one that demands national uniformity or that is part of a national
market.103
In t;he tax analysis, commentators analogize Internet regulation with the
Court's Quill Corp. v. North Dakota decision to strike down a state's attempt to
tax interstate mail orders.104 In Quill Corp., the Court determined that
"unexceptional" procedures of state authority become unauthorized when
multiple standards would create a large burden for those organizations who
operate in more than one state.lOS As logic might suggest, "if this 'interstate
burden' analysis is sufficient to bar state action in the extremely important area
of taxation, then it is difficult to see why it should not apply with equal force
in the area of obscenity law."106

B. Internet Characteristics Fit with Commerce Clause Violation
A simple comparison of the characteristics of the Internet medium to the tests
set out by the Court finds that a generic state law regulating Internet content
would likely run afoul of the federal government's dormant Commerce Clause.
As a medium accessible by anyone from practically anywhere, the Internet
transcends state boundaries.107 By design, it is a national, if not worldwide,
transportation device for communication.108 Because Internet users generally
cannot prevent their communications or content from being accessed by a
geographical section of the country,109 any state law that regulates Internet
content or communications within a state runs the risk of having an extra terri-

101Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
102Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580
(1986). See also BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
103Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex. rei. Sullivan,325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945). See also Pataki,
969 F. Supp. at 161 (in which Judge Preska analogizes the Internet to a highway or a
railroad).
104504 U.S. at 298.
lOS Reynolds, supra note 81 at 539.
106Jd. at 539-40.

107 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335.
108Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767; Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160.

109 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
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torial effect on Internet sites outside that area.llO The inability to prevent access
also puts content providers at risk to host of inconsistent regulations in different
jurisdictions.lll To compensate, non-profit and profit content providers would
be forced to censor their content to satisfy the "lowest common denominator"
state law, creating an undue burden on interstate commerce that would
outweigh the local benefit that may have spawned the legislation.l12
A finding of economic benefit discrimination would most likely be limited
to a specific case. For example, potential regulation in New York that hopes to
ban internet sales of alcohol might be struck down under dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny because its outward motive is to help the sales of in-state
wholesalers.113
C. American Libraries Association v. PatakiY 4 Its Commerce Clause Application

and Ramifications
Still in its youth, Internet law as of yet has a dearth of case law with actual
Internet Commerce Clause application. Perhaps the first case that directly
applied the Commerce Clause to an Internet regulation involved a national
association that successfully sued the State of New York in federal court,
claiming the state's 1996law outlawing adult Internet contact of a sexual nature
with minors was unconstitutional on First Amendment and Commerce Clause
grounds.115 On June 20, 1997, United States District Court Judge Loretta A.
Preska permanently enjoined any state action under the law after analyzing the
statute under commerce clause scrutiny:
I find ... that the Internet is analogous to a highway or railroad. This
determination means that the phrase 'information superhighway' is
more than a mere buzzword; it has legal significance, because the
similarity between the Internet and more traditional instruments of
interstate commerce leads to analysis under the Commerce ClauseY 6
Specifically, Judge Preska ruled that the criminal statute under scrutiny had
extraterritorial effects and placed a burden on interstate commerce that clearly
exceeded its benefit to its local interest.117 Generally, however, Preska found it
110See Healy, 491 U.S. at 324.
lllSee Bibb, 359 U.S. at 520.
ll2Jnternet Casino, supra note 47, at 2055.
113'Cyberbooze' Increasingly Common on Internet, Group Says (posted Dec. 12, 1997)
(visited Dec. 12, 1997) <http:/ /www.cnn.com/TECH/>.
114Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160. Pataki is governor of New York.
115Id. Many other groups joined as plaintiff, including American Booksellers
Foundation for Free Expression, Bibliobytes, Magazine Publishers of America, Art on
the Net and the ACLU.
116 Id. at 161.

117Jd. at 169. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235.21 (McKinney 1984).
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difficult to determine how a state could fashion an internet content regulation
without violating a prong of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. us
The New York statute in question, section 235.21 of the New York Penal Law,
made it a crime to "intentionally use ... any computer communication system
allowing the input, output, examination, or transfer, of computer data or
computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage" in
communication with a minor that "in whole or in part depicts actual or
simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse, and which is
harmful to minors."119 Preska determined that the law contained no language
that required the criminal activity to occur solely in New York, nor, as
evidenced by its legislative history, was it intended to apply only to New York
residents making contact with other New York residents,l20 The benefit to the
local interest the law seeks to protect-the possible prosecution of New York
sexual predators who attempt to entice New York children-is arguably small,
considering the amount of pornographic material and conversation sent to U.S.
Internet computer servers from sites outside the country,l21 Its size is especially
small when compared to the possible chilling effect the law could have on
anyone whose Internet communication might be accessed by a New Yorker
and might be criminally liable,l22
Moreover, Preska determined, the nature of the Internet effectively precludes
the possibility that the New York lawmakers could avoid dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny with any statute that limits its effect to interstate
communication because "no [intrastate] communications exist."123 Limited by
technology and a lack of fixed locational situs to specifically target, an
Oklahoma artist who showcases his wares on a Web page cannot close his site
to New Yorkers any more than he can close it to countries outside the United
States.l24 Most times, the Internet user may be ignorant as to where his message
has arrived, and even if not, the user may be misled about the location.l25 On
the flip side, a New York e-mail may well pass through computer servers in
any number of locations outside the state before it arrives at the computer of
another New Yorker, turning intrastate transmissions into interstate mails, and

118Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 170.

119 Id. at 163.
120Jd. at 169.
121See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 916, affg without opposition, Reno v. Shea, 117 S. Ct. 2501
(approximating thirty percent of sexually explicit material currently available on the
Internet originates outside the United States); See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (nearly half of sexually explicit material originates outside of the United
States).
122See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173.
123Jd. at 171.
124Jd. at 173.
125Jd. at 170.
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involving the sender or service provider in a potential myriad of inconsistent
laws.126 "Further development of the Internet requires that users be able to
predict the results of their Internet use with some degree of certainty," Preska
cautioned in her opinion.l27 With no certainty of locational effect by state laws,
the Internet should receive uniform, predictable national treatment in the form
of federal regulations.

D. ACLU v. Miller: 128 A Hypothetical Example
A recently overruled Georgia law attempted to regulate the Internet at its
lack-of-location core: domain names and e-mail addresses.129 Although the
federal district court in ACLU v. Miller did not use a dormant commerce clause
analysis, instead opting to rule only on the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim,
the case seemed ripe for review under the clause. Had that court applied the
dormant clause test, it would have found a different but compelling argument
to enjoin enforcement of the statute.
On June 23, 1997, Senior District Judge Marvin H. Shoob of the Federal
Northern District of Georgia ruled that the law's restrictions were vague and
overly broad, so much that Internet users would have a difficult time
determining what actions would constitute a violation.130 In his analysis, Judge
Shoob pointed to (1) the law's lack of necessity of intent to defraud and (2) the
questionable definition of the word "use," as parts of the legislation that might

126See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.

127Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183.
128Jd. at 80, 183. Judge Preska's determination made quick, albeit limited, impact on
state Internet regulation elsewhere. Little more than a year after Pataki, a New Mexico
federal judge ruled on almost identical commerce clause analysis to enjoin action under
an Internet content-related criminal statute. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.
The law, adopted in 1998, prohibited "dissemination" on-line to a minor of content
"harmful to a minor," such as nudity or sexual conduct. Violation of the law was
punishable by imprisonment of one year and/or a $1,000 fine. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-37-3.2(A) (1978). See also Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (complaint), available on
<http://www .aclu.org/ court/ acluvjohnson_complaint.html>.
Citing Pataki in his brief opinion, District Court Judge Hansen determined that the
statute violated the federal commerce clause because it regulated conduct outside New
Mexico, placed an unreasonable and undue burden on interstate commerce and
subjected Internet users to inconsistent state regulations. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d at
1033-34. Hansen also said that the statute's defenses-use of mandatory age or credit
card notification software-were cost prohibitive to Internet context providers. Id.
129 ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 997). Zell Miller is governor of the
state of Georgia.

130Miller, 977F. Supp. at 1228, GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-9-93.1 (1996). The statute made it
unlawful for an entity to knowingly transmit data through the Internet or other
computer transmission facilities if such data "uses any individual name, trade name,
registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol to falsely
identify the person, organization or representive transmitting such data" or to state or
imply that the entity has permission to use such symbol, etc., when the entity has not
obtained such permission. GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-9-93.1(a).
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make innocent people think they were in violation, and allow the state to
selectively prosecute who it wanted.131 Shoob said he expressed concern that
the law would chill legal speech.132 The Georgia statute made it criminal for
"any person to knowingly transmit any data by a computer network" for
purposes such as "exchanging data with an electronic information storage bank
or point of access to electronic information" if those people "use" a name to
falsely identify themselves, or if they use a trade name or logo in their
identification that would falsely imply they had permission for its use.133
By attacking the sometimes deceptive domain names and e-mail addresses
of Internet users, Georgia lawmakers might have eliminated possibilities for
confusion over location, and helped to prevent Internet fraud or
misrepresentation. The state contended that the law aimed to prevent fraud
which it claimed as the local interest it was aiding with the legislation in
question.134 However, as Judge Shoob alluded to in his opinion, the law had
an extraterritorial effect that burdened interstate commerce and outweighed
the benefit it gave to the state of Georgia.135 Specifically, it restricted Internet
content providers' use of World Wide Web "links" to lead or connect a viewer
from their Web site to another site run by a person in Georgia or somewhere
else.136 The law's authors, like in Pataki, could not partition its effect to
intrastate communication because of the vaguity of the domain names or
addresses they were limiting, causing a chill in Internet communication.
A fair reading of the clause, as written, is that it prohibits the current
use of web page links. The linking function requires publishers of web
pages to include symbols designating other web pages which may be
of interest to a user. This means that an entity or person's seal may
appear on hundreds or thousands of other web pages, just for the
purpose of enabling the linking system. 137

Shoob amplified the burden on interstate commerce when he discovered a
variety of less restrictive Georgia statutes already in place to address fraud and
misrepresentation, such as statutes criminalizing computer theft by deception,
unauthorized and deceitful use of name or seal of another and unfair and

131Jd. at 1232-34.
132Jd. at 1234.
133GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-9-93.1 (1996).
134Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1232.
135See Pike, 397 U.S. at 137.
136Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1233, n.S.

137Jd. "The appearance of the seal, although completely innocuous, would definitely
'imply' to many users that permission for use had been obtained. Defendants have
articulated no compelling state interest that would be furthered by restricting the linking
function in this way." Id.
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deceptive consumer trade practices.138 Unlike Judge Preska, Judge Shoob did
not limit Internet regulations to the federal sector.139

E. People v. Lipsitz: Limitations to Commerce Clause Application?
Despite the Pataki disavowance of all state regulation of Internet content, a
New York state court decision soon after Pataki contends some state Internet
regulation passes constitutional muster.140 State consumer fraud statutes that
merely "tangentially" imply a burden to interstate commerce should stand in
the face of the Internet's geographically vague nature, said the court in People
v. Lipsitz, a case decided three days after Pataki.l41 The decision initially might
beg distinction because it deals with an existing state law being applied to a
new medium, rather than testing a law targeted directly at a particular
medium.l42 The extent of the impact potentially caused by the Lipsitz case is
discussed below.
The defendant, Kevin Jay Lipsitz, was restrained from fraudulent activities
he committed in association with his business of soliciting magazine
subscriptions through bulk e-mail messages.143 Defendant, among other
activities, used false e-mail addresses and false testimonials from fictitious
members of listservs and newsgroups to attract sales from other members of
those groups.144 After the interested parties sent their money to the defendant's
service, they either received no magazines or a few sporadic issues.145
Determining that all of the defendant's activities occurred in New York, the
state attorney general charged the defendant with violations of state consumer
fraud laws.146
Unlike the laws implicated in Pataki and Miller, the consumer fraud statute
in question in Lipsitz specifically targets only residents of the state of New
York.l47 Consumer fraud laws affect people outside the state's boundaries on
purpose but, the prosecution contended, only to include outsiders' fraud
claims against a state resident,l48 Judge Diane A. Lebedeff in the Lipsitz case

138Jd. at 1234.
139Jd.
140Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 468.

141Jd. at 468,475.
142Jd. at 471. See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§§ 349, 350 (McKinney 1984).
143Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
144Jd. at 470,471.
145Jd. at 470.
146Jd. at 474.
147N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw§§ 349,350 (McKinney 1984).
148Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
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termed the connection with interstate commerce "tangential."149 However,
according to Judge Lebedeff, even if the law were more general, neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Internet's complicated geographic problems would
prevent the law's applicability at least in this particular situation.ISO
[F]or Internet consumer fraud claims, the Internet medium is
essentially irrelevant, for the focus is primarily upon the location of the
messenger and whether the messenger delivered what was purchased.
In some cases, it might be necessary to analyze the location of certain other
business operations, such as the site used or the place orders were received.
Such refinements are unnecessary here for the entire enterprise was
firmly based in New York State (emphasis added). 151
Concepts that might have invalidated state laws that have interstate effects
should not stop New York's attorney general from enforcing a state law against
a local seller who happened to sell his products on the internet.l52
There is no compelling reason to find that local legal officials must take
a "hands off" approach just because a crook or a con artist is
technologically sophisticated enough to sell on the Internet. Invocation
of 'the Internet' is not the equivalent to a cry of 'sanctuary' upon a
criminal's entry into a medieval church. 153
Interestingly, the defendant in Lipsitz did not raise a Commerce Clause
argument. The judge raised it.l54 Perhaps because of that, readers have little on
which to consider an argument that the burden on interstate commerce exceeds
the benefits of the statute. Nor do we have knowledge of whether, as evidenced
by the out-of-state complaints, Lipsitz subjected himself to inconsistent laws
because of the access any Internet user could have to the messages he left in
cyberspace, and because he targeted the world-wide Internet audience .ISS An
equally looming question is whether the sale occurred completely in
cyberspace, or after an initial inquiry, the transaction happened in real space
through a more locationally sound "snail-mail" system.J56 Answers to such
questions could determine whether the locational vagueness of the Internet

149Jd. at 475.
I50Jd. In fact, Judge Lebedeff directly distinguishes the situation from the situation
described in Pataki.

151Jd. at 474.
152Jd. at 475.
I53Upsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 475.

l54Jd. at 474.
I55See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
156"Snail mail" is the common Internet term for the postal system. Regarding activity
completely in cyberspace, see supra note 81.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

19

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

148

[Vol. 46:129

would strengthen or weaken a Commerce Clause argument against the New
York statute,l57
In addition, despite Judge Lebedeff's insistence that the law was of a local
concern and "touch[es] upon no known federal policy which requires
uniformity," the opinion cites the law's similarity to laws in other states and
states the sections are based on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,l58 With such evidence, instead of distinguishing the Lipsitz situation from
Pataki, Judge Lebedeff's opinion actually implies that any state law regulating
Internet content must have its basis in federal, uniform law, in line with what
Judge Preska in Pataki recommends.159
Lipsitz is perhaps the most recent argument for some type of state internet
content regulation. Other recent arguments in favor of state regulation have
surfaced on two fronts: the state's right under its police power and the federal
government's lack of right under any affirmative Commerce Clause power.160
As before mentioned, much of the states' content regulation centers on a
child's access to pornographic material on the Internet. Historically, the power
to "control the conduct of children" lies within a state's police power, much like
its rights to deny minors the right to marry or to vote,l61 Specifically, sexual
morality falls within state concerns.162 Congress, on the other hand, has no
substantive power over sexual morality, nor does it have a general police
power.l63
Instead, Congress must find its regulation power in the Commerce Clause.
As demonstrated in the 1995 case, United States v. Lopez, the federal
government's commerce power has limits.l64 The Court in Lopez struck down
a federal statute that outlawed knowing possession of firearms in an area the
violator knows or has reason to know is a school zone.l65 "If under Lopez
Congress lacks power under the Commerce Clause to protect children from the
very serious problem of violence associated with guns in school1:l, it is hard to
see why its interest in shielding them from private online speech should be con-

157See supra
15BLipsitz,

notes 83-101 and accompanying text.

663 N.Y.S.2d at 475, 15 U.S. C. A.§ 45 (West 1994).

159 Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 182 (1997).
160 Amicus Curie Brief of Apollomedia Corp. and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual
Freedom in Support of Affirmance, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 1997 WL
74391) [hereinafter Apollomedia].
161Apollomedia,

1997 WL 74391 at *10 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,

638-639 (1968)).
162Jd.

at *6 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 (1957)).

163Jd.
164514 u.s. 549 (1995).
165Jd.
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sidered 'compelling'."166 Such an argument does not account for states' recent
problems with violating the federal government's dormant Commerce Clause
arena, nor addresses any potential conflict with the Internet's geographical
ignorance.
Of course, commentators Glenn Harlan Reynolds and Gregory A. Ichel
suggest the federal government can always, in its authority, authorize a
Commerce Clause violation to allow the states to regulate the internet,l67
Recent events, however, show that rationale does not appear to be in the federal
government's interest,168 as Congress and the Clinton administration attempt
to regulate the Internet from a national perspective.

V. FEDERAL REGULATION: ZONING WITHOUT ZONES
Congress has already tried and failed once to regulate content on the
Internet, with 1996's CDA,l69 Nonetheless, several commentators,170 including
two Supreme Court justices,171 see in the failed act's intent an indirect way to
harness the Internet's content: to zone it.
The first attempt to zone the Internet would likely affect pornographic
material.172 Zoning by content must pass the muster of particular rules set
down by the Court. Internet sites' lack of fixed location, at first glance, makes

l66Apollomedia, 1997 WL 74391 at *7.

167Reynolds, supra note 81, at 542 n.20. See also Gregory lchel, Internet Sounds Death
Knell For Use Taxes: States Continue to Scream over Lost Revenues, 27 SETON HALL L. REv.
643,656 (1997).
l68See infra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.

16947 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West 1994 and Supp.1997). That's not to say Congress has
stopped trying to regulate Internet content. S.R. 1482 seeks to prohibit commercial
operators from distributing materials harmful to minors. S.R. 1482, 105th Cong. (1998).
<ftp:/ /ftp.loc.gov /pub/thomas/ c105/s1482.is.txt.> (visited Sept. 9, 1998) The bill,
dubbed "CDA II," is a step back for legislators. The original CDA outlawed both
commercial and non-commercial distribution of the rna terials. See Senate Measures Would
Limit Minors' Access to 'Cyberporn' (posted March 14, 1998) (visited Sept. 9, 1998)
<http:/ /cnn.com/allpolitics/1998/03/18/cg/ internet.html>. See also note 224 and
accompanying text.
170Lawrence Lessig, who was recently asked to help the government in the recent
Microsoft antitrust litigation, is perhaps the most prominent. See, e.g., The Constitution
of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMM. LAw.
CONSPECTUS 181, 185 (1997).
l7lReno, 117 U.S. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, J., concurring).

172Indeed, the Philadelphia group that formed the CDA only wanted to target
pornography. See Rebecca Dessoffy, Salvaging the Communications Decency Act in the
Wake of ACLU v. Reno and Shea v. Reno, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 271 (1997) (citingACLU, 929
F. Supp. at 879).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

21

150

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:129

application of those rules difficult.173 However, other facets of the medium,
such as the small burden to access it, could justify location restrictions)74
A. ACLU v. Reno: Justice O'Connor's Prognosis for the CDA's "Zoning" Motive

On its face, the CDA prohibited Internet users from communicating in
certain ways with minors.175 Specifically, users could not knowingly transmit
"obscene or indecent communications by means of telecommunications
device" to persons aged eighteen and under, nor use an "interactive computer
service" to transmit "patently offensive communications" to minors.176
According to the Court, the Act did not adequately define the content it
prohibited.l77 Although the Act did offer several defenses for users to avoid
sanctions,178 the Court struck down the act because its "overbreadth and
vagueness" restricted adult users' access to several forms of First Amendment
protected speech, and because the government had less restrictive options that
could foster the act's purpose.179 The Court's majority did leave open the
possibility for future Internet regulatory legislation)BO
However, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in her concurring opinion,l81
pointed out that while some of the provisions indeed restricted adults, none of
the CDA's contested portions purported to keep indecent or patently offensive
material on the Internet away from them)B2 "Thus," she said, "the undeniable
purpose of the CD A is to segregate indecent rna terial on the Internet into certain
areas that minors cannot access," or zoning)B3
Creation of "adult zones" on the Internet is perfectly valid and fits with Court
precedent, O'Connor said)84 In addition, according to O'Connor, the Internet
as a medium is almost as conducive to zoning as the physical world,l85 as
evidenced by the identity screens many Web sites construct as an entrance gate.
173See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.

174See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
175Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2338.

17647 U.S.C.A. § 223(a),(d) (West 1994, Supp. 1997).
l77Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.

178See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5).
179 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-46, 2348.
l80Jd. at 2339, n.30. See also It's Back to the Drawing Board After High Court Ruling in

14-3 COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST 3, 4 (1997).
181Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.

RENO,

182Jd. at 2352.
183Jd.
184Jd. at 2351.
185 Id. at 2353. O'Connor called cyberspace "malleable," making it "more amenable to
zoning laws." Id.
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Commentators agree: "If zoning is a perfectly permissible activity in real space,
what possible argument would there be that this zoning is impermissible in
cyberspace ?"186
There are a few arguments. To pass constitutional muster, no zoning law may
"unduly" restrict adult access to material or restrict minors from any material
which they have a First Amendment right to access.187 Several provisions of
the CDA failed the test's first part when compared to certain possible Internet
situations, according to O'Connor. She recommended invalidating those
sections only.188 For example, the rights of two adults, who should be able to
communicate offensive material to each other, are infringed when in an Internet
unit such as IRC, an unknown party entered and the adults could not determine
the party's age.189
The aforementioned factual hypothesis demonstrates a more general
problem that O'Connor said she feared: that a zoning law constructed to mirror
the physical world's zoning laws might not zone out minors, presumably
because of the locational and identificational vaguities associated with the
Internet medium)90 The zoning law theory is further weakened, O'Connor
said, becau$e it must rely on technological advance for its backbone.191 As of
yet, the "gateway technology" O'Connor sees as necessary to Internet zoning
regulation is not prevalent.192 Site-based software that requires users to enter
information about themselves, and self-screening software are both available
to some extent, however.l93 But without "ubiquitous" gateway technology since the Internet presumably cannot be broken down into physical areas- the
Internet remains "unzoned-and unzoneable."194

B. The First Amendment's Time, Place, Manner Analysis Applied to Internet
Technology
The Court has initially reviewed most zoning statutes that regulate
speech-especially those that appear to restrict pornographic material-under

186Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45

EMORY

L.J.

869, 894

(1997).

l87Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2352.
lBBJd. at 2355.
l89Jd.
l90Jd. at 2353. "[Before today][t]he Court did not question-and therefore necessarily
assumed-that an adult zone, once created, would succeed in preserving adults' access
while denying minors' access to the regulated speech. Before today, there was no reason
to question this assumption ... " Id.
l9lfd. at 2354.
l92Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354.
l93Jd. See also <http://www.cyberpatrol.com>; <http://www.surfwatch.com>.
l94Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354.
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a "time, place and manner" ("TPM") First Amendment analysis.l95 However,
the majority in Reno cast aside suggestions to analyze the CDA as a time, place
or manner regulation, deeming the Act a more invasive content-based
"blanket"196 restriction instead:
According to the government, the CDA is constitutional because it
constitutes a sort of "cyberzoning" on the Internet. But the CDA
applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace. And the purpose
of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of "indecent"
and "patently offensive" speech, rather than any "secondary" effect of
such speech. Thus the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on
speech, and, as such, cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time,
. W7
p 1ace and manner regu1ahon.
Content-based restrictions traditionally are deemed more of a burden on First
Amendment rights and face a tougher "strict scrutiny" standard,l98 Were the
Court to apply the typical TPM analysis to any Internet zoning-type regulation,
such a statute would be hard-pressed to pass muster under the lesser standard.
Courts will view regulations under TPM standards only if it deems the
statutes or laws as content neutral and as concerned with the secondary effects
of the regulated medium or place.199 Once classified as a TPM regulation, a law
passes constitutional muster if it is "narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
governmental interest" and if it leaves "ample alternative channels for
communication of the restricted expression."200
Statutes are content neutral if their proponents can justify them "without
reference to the content of the regulated speech."201 For example, the District
of Columbia park service refused to allow all-night protests in certain parts of
a park.202 The park agents justified the prohibition because the law prohibited
all-night camping in that area, regardless of its expressive qualities, and
provided other ample areas where the offenders could camp.203
In some cases, the Court has expanded the definition of content neutral even
more. For example, the Court in a recent adult movie theater zoning case
determined that a city ordinance was content neutral-even though it plainly

l95See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
196Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.

197Jd.
198Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
199U.S. Sound & Service, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 126 F.3d 555, 558 (3d Cir. 1997).
200Jd. at 558. See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288

(1984).
201C[ark, 468 U.S. at 293.

202Jd. at 292.
203Jd. at 295.
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treated adult theaters differently than other theaters-because its "predominate
concerns" were secondary effects and not content.204
The Court has compiled over the years a laundry list of effects deemed
secondary. They include preventing crime, protecting the city's retail track,
maintaining property values, and generally protecting and preserving
neighborhoods and commerce districts.205 In a 1970's case, also involving adult
theaters, the court upheld a zoning regulation that outlawed the theaters within
1,000 feet of certain establishments,206 because the regulation was "unaffected
by whatever social, political or philosophical message [the] film[s) may be
intended to communicate.... What is at stake is nothing more than a limitation
on the place where adult films may be exhibited."207 Though the ordinance
forced viewers to travel to another part of town to see the films, such a
restriction was incidental and minimal to expression.208
At first glance, Internet zoning would seem to analogize well to the park
example in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. Restricting adult
material to a certain series of domain names "neither attempts to ban ...
generally nor to ban it everywhere" on the Internet.209 The Internet has
"established areas for" pornographic material "and forbids it elsewhere."210
However, while federal legislators could theoretically zone the Internet in a
number of ways, each way would potentially lack at least one characteristic of
a TPM regulation. Although the CDA failed the content-neutral characteristic,
recent technology offers more neutral avenues.
One potential scheme of Internet legislation involves incorporating a
"tagging"211 technology-called The Platform for Internet Content Selection
("PICS")-into all Internet browser software. The legislation would require all
Internet content providers either voluntarily to tag a "rating"212 to their site or
to submit to a rating system. However, the legislation would allow search

204Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,475 U.S.41,47 (1986). But see U.S. Sound & Service,
126 F.3d. at 559.

205 Id. at 48.
206Young, 427 U.S. at 50.
207fd. at 70, n.35. The situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect
of suppressing, or greatly restricting, access to lawful speech.
208fd. at 71.
209Clark, 468 U.S. at 295.
210[d.
211See Jonathan Weber, A New Battle Over Keeping the Web Clean (posted Aug. 7, 1997)
(visited Jan. 7, 1998) <http:/ /www.cnn.com/TECH/9708/07 /internet.decency.lat.
index.html> (describing the probable PICS voluntary system approach). See also The
!LPN Discusses PICS with Joseph Reagle of the W3 Consortium (posted Aug. 18, 1997)
(visited Jan. 3, 1998)<http:/ /www.collegehill.com/ilp-news/reagle.html>.
212See Weber, supra note 212. "The theory is that once PICS is in place throughout the
Internet, a multiplicity of ratings systems would emerge .... Parents and others could
easily choose.... [S]uch a tool will inevitably be used by public institutions and
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engines to list any sites that had tags.213 The end result would be a system
useable by parents to block certain content, recognizable by its tag, from view
by their children.214 Because it in essence requires a tag on every Internet site,
the regulation would have a neutral emphasis on content.215
However, the regulation and any potential zoning legislation-would likely
fail to address effects other than primary effects, since few if any effects of the
Internet have been proven to exist that do not relate to its content. Unlike adult
theaters and bookstores, which reside in the physical world, the content of
Internet sites and the people that access it have not been linked to a depreciation
of the value of neighboring sites or a decrease in sales of a nearby commercial
site. The explanation for such a failure is obviously the theme of this Note:
Internet sites and communication have no fixed physical situs, from which to
determine their effect on other fixed sites. And users nor commentators do not
know nor, because of the Internet's geographical ignorance, can they categorize
all Internet sites in the various locations to track any secondary effects those
sites might have on areas in the physical world.
Legislators have several arguments as to secondary effects. For example,
Congress could introduce legislation, under the guise of the Renton case,216 to
add a distinctive domain name level to the addresses of Internets sites that
purvey indecent material. The purpose would be to eliminate the negative
commercial effect the more innocuously named sites might have on the
legitimate commercial sites they are grouped together with when a user
searches by topic on an Internet search engine.217 Congress might also consider
similar legislation regarding unauthorized links in the same context.218 The
lack of a location basis for Internet sites would complicate the process.
At the same time, Internet sites' lack of geographical boundaries might prove
a saving grace. Even if Congressional legislation restricting pornographic
content were to falter under TPM analysis and face strict scrutiny, it might still
pass muster. To survive strict scrutiny, a regulation must serve a compelling
state interest "in a manner which imposes least possible burden on
expression."219 The Court has strongly considered the protection of minors

governments, if not here then abroad to restrict speech." Id.
213Id.
214Jd.
215See U.S. Sound & Service, Inc., 126 F.3d. at 558.
216Renton, 475 U.S. at 41.
217See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 930. Shea was upheld, without comment, by the U.S.
Supreme Court the day after it announced the ACLU v. Reno decision.
218See Washington Post v. TotalNews, No. 97Civ. 1190 (complaintfiled Feb. 20,1997,
S.D.N.Y. 1997). See also Wendy R. Leibowitz, How Risky is Business on the Internet?
Disputes Go Beyond the Choice of a Domain Name, NAT'L L.J., May 26, 1997, at Bl.
219U.S. Sound & Service, Inc., 126 F.3d at 558.
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from material deemed harmful to them as a compelling state interest.220 In
addition, the types of burdens recommended to be imposed on users and
content providers are negligible-no more than a few clicks of a keyboard
"mouse" and a minute of typing.221
C. Government's Hands-Off Approach

Even presuming the federal government could constitutionally regulate the
geographically vague Internet, as has been surmised in earlier sections of this
Note, such presumption does not mean the government will do so. In fact,
despite a flurry of possible legislation, President Clinton has announced that
the government should and will take a hands-off approach to the Internet,
leaving reforms to private industry.222 Industry monitoring of the Internet,
while contingent upon antitrust obeyances, would push to the side problems
caused by the Internet's ignorance of geography.
Since the CDA's virtual demise, Congress and the President have both
attempted more Internet regulations. Some members of Congress have
proposed a sequel to the CDA, with more specifically defined violations and
parameters.223 Others have attempted to tie federal discounts for Internet
installation at public schools and libraries to use of content-blocking
software.224 In December, the President signed into law The No Electronic Theft
Act ("NET" act), which expands copyright infringement liability on the
Internet.225 In addition, in July 1997, the Clinton administration announced its
intent to continue to enforce laws to protects minors on-line, as part of its
"Strategy for a Family Friendly Internet."226
However, in 1997 the President led a charge to pass legislation outlawing
state Internet taxes.227 Even more, President Clinton publicly announced, in

220 Id. at 557.
221Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 12 (1996-97). "This
whole process took about a minute, and with this minute's investment, I was then armed
with a code that would (I was promised) give me access to a wide range of web pages
that similarly limit access.... " Id.
222U.S. Releases Plan for Internet's Future (posted Jan. 30, 1998) (visited Jan. 30, 1998)
<http:/ /www.cnn.com/TECH/9801/30/internet.html> [hereafter U.S. releases].
223 See New Internet Censorship Bill Ignores Landmark Supreme Court Ruling (posted date
unknown) (visited Jan. 3, 1998) <http:/ /www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/updates/
nov1897.html>.
224See S. 1619, 105th Cong.
225See http:/ /www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/updates/ dec2497.html.
226See A 'Family Friendly' Internet (posted date unknown) (visited Jan. 3, 1998)
<http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov /WH/New /Ratings>. See also Gore Announces Steps
Toward an Electronic Bill of Rights (posted July 31, 1998) (visited Sept. 9, 1998)
<http:/ I cnn.com/ allpolitics/1998/07 /31 /internet. privacy I index.html>.
227 See Cyberlex-Updated 8/97: Notable Legal Developments Reported in July 1997 Include
the
Following:
(posted date unknown) (visited Jan. 3, 1998)
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January 1998, a plan to "reduce the government's role as traffic cop for the
Internet."228 The plan entails, among other initiatives, shifting many Net
operating functions-especially the registering of domain names-to the
private sector over a two-year period, and opening them to competition.229
VI. SELF-REGULATION:

A THIRD VIABLE OPTION?

In several of his writings, commentator Lawrence Lessig predicts that to
successfully regulate the Internet, the government will shift to a different
regulatory technique: regulating indirectly.230 Perhaps the government
already has.
Over the past few years, it has appeared as if private Internet industry, free
from the problems of legislators who must deal with the physical limitations
of the law, has begun to zone and regulate itself and create its own
geography.231 Many Internet sites that house risque content have built
"computer graphical interfaces" or "cgi's" around their sites.232 Providers use
cgi's so that users must, before entering, provide either a password obtained
directly from the content provider or a password obtained from an
independent organization that checks user information.233 An independent
group of Internet industry leaders recently recommended a further "cyber-

<http:/ /www.cyberlaw.com/ cylx0707.html>. The 105th Congress has grappled with
how long a moratorium on taxes to impose. See Vote Bodes Ill for Internet Tax Agreement
(posted
Aug.
3,
1998)
(visited
Sept.
9,
1998)
<http:/ /cnn.com/ ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/03/ cg/internet.html>. Sales taxes on
Internet purchases would not be affected, however, as long as they apply only to
transactions within the same state. See Internet Firms Seek End to Taxes (posted Sept. 8,
1998)
(visited
Sept.
8,
1998)
<http:/ /www.cnn.com/
ALLPOLITICS/1998/09/08/internet.apl>.
228See U.S. releases, supra, note 223.
229 Id. Although access to the Internet and many operations are effectively controlled
by private interests already, the government has maintained a management and
bankrolling function in areas of cyberspace invisible to the average surfer of the World
Wide Web. The Defense Department, for example, has financed the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority, which allocates blocks of numerical addresses used by Internet
service providers and is run by an institute at the University of Southern California.
That's one of the responsibilities the government wants to give up. Id.
230Lessig, supra note 187, at 910. See also Weber, supra note 212.
231 Lessig, supra note 187, at 888. "Quite without government mandate and indeed
without anything like a centralized process of decision, cyberspace is already becoming
something quite different. ... It is moving, that is, from a relatively unzoned place to a
universe that is extraordinarily well-zoned." Id.
232Jd. at 887.
233Jd.
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spacial" boundary: forcing all sites that contain indecent content to have the
top domain designation "-.xxx."234
In December 1997, the on-line industry agreed with federal police
organizations to report instances of pornography, and adopted voluntary
guidelines to help keep social security numbers and other sensitive personal
information "out of publicly accessed databases,"235 in effect creating its own
police force. Microsoft and Netscape, two of the biggest giants in Internet
software, agreed to gradually include parental control software that recognizes
"tagging" into all of their Web browser products.236
However, the independence of the industry efforts is questionable. It is
disputed as to whether content providers would have built cgi's without the
threat of CDA penalties,237 and as to the influence the government might have
over the industry's decisions.238
VII. CONCLUSION
It appears as if, by a legal process of elimination, self-regulation is the most
attractive and immediate means to regulate the Internet. Internet sites' lack of
a firm physical situs could cause any state regulation to balloon into an
extraterritorial regulation.239 One result is predictable: chilled speech. Federal
regulations, which still look promising in the form of zoning, face an uphill
battle. Congressional legislators would have to prove the existence of
secondary effects on the Internet, or face strict scrutiny, a battle they could
win.240
The intent of this Note is not to determine a solution for legislators
attempting to regulate the Internet, because as of yet, the information is too
sparse to formulate one. Instead, this Note attempts to flesh out the problems
legislators on all levels have faced or will face when they attempt regulation.
True self-regulation has its own problems. Working without precedent,
without even a firm handle on what analogy to use for the Internet,
self-regulators could face the task of creating and implementing an entirely

234See http:/ /www.cyberlaw.com/cylx0997.html (listing notable Internet developments for September 1997). "The Generic Top-Level Domain Policy Oversight
Committee, an influential body consisting of 150 technology companies from around
the world, has proposed that the suffix .xxx be used in Internet addresses for
adult-oriented Websites." Id.
235See Weber, supra note 212.

236See A 'Family Friendly' Internet, supra note 227.
237 See Dessoffy, supra note 167. See also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 827.
238See Weber, supra note 212. See also Forum Aims for Self-Discipline.on Internet (posted
Jan. 7, 1997) (visited Jan. 7, 1998) <http:/ /www.cnn.com/TECH/9801/07 I
internet.law.ap/>.
239See supra notes 101-03, 111-13, 127 and accompanying text.
240See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
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new rule system. That is, if they decide to veer from the federal government's
recommendations.241
More immediately, the advent of PICS technology-the Internet industry's
most controversial step toward regulation-might be a step backward.242
Whereas the CDA regulated only pornographic sites and content, PICS "creates
an infrastructure for regulating every conceivable form of contentand to an
indefinite degree."243
Self-regulators admit they face an uncertain path toward creating an
efficient, yet law-abiding framework for the intemet.244 Unlike the other
legislative levels, though, their problems are lessened by their lack of need to
address the sometimes unknown destinations and origins of Internet
information.
CHRISTOPHER S.W. BLAKE

241M.A. Stapleton, Self-Regulation Seen as Major Problem Facing Internet Users, CHI.
L. BULL., Sept. 17, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Self-Regulation].

DAILY

242Joshua Micah Marshall, Were We Wrong about the CDA? (posted Nov. 17, 1997)
(visited Jan. 3, 1998) <http: I I collegehill.com/ilp-news I marshall3.html>.

243[d.
244See Self Regulation, supra note 242.
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